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Abstract
A large-scale field experiment (N = 646,116) from the Refund to Savings Initiative tested a choice
architecture and persuasive messaging intervention that increased saving among low-moderate income
(LMI) consumers by approximately 50% during tax refund time. Two follow-up experiments parsed
components of the intervention. The first follow-up experiment (N = 569) tested the messaging and
choice architecture interventions separately, finding that each can increase savings. A final follow-up
experiment (N = 554) tested individual elements of the choice architecture intervention,
demonstrating that mere mention of savings within choice options was not sufficient to increase
saving, however, heavy emphasis of savings and making saving “frictionless” within choice options
both effectively increased saving intentions. The final experiment also demonstrated that the choice
architecture effect operates similarly for both LMI and non-LMI consumers.

Keywords: Choice Architecture, Decision Making, Savings, Persuasion, Financial Decision Making
American households, including low- and moderate-income (LMI) households in particular, do not
have enough savings to cover unforeseen expenses. Nationally representative data from the Pew
Charitable Trusts 1 show that 41% of households do not have liquid savings to cover a $2,000
expense in the case of an emergency; for low-income families that rate increases to 78%. Yet,
financial emergencies are frequent: 60% of American households report a financial shock within the
past year. 2
Tax refunds offer potential relief to LMI households. A substantial percentage of LMI households
are eligible for tax refunds, 3 and these refunds constitute a sizeable portion of annual income for
LMI consumers (often equating an entire month of pay). 4 Tax refund time has been identified as a
“savable moment” for LMI consumers 5 and may be the only time of the year when LMI consumers
reasonably can afford to set aside money as savings. 6,7 In this research, we test the influence of a
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persuasive messaging and choice architecture intervention on LMI consumers’ real and simulated
decisions to put money into savings accounts at tax refund time.
The use of persuasive messaging to influence behavior is ubiquitous in both commercial marketing
and public policy campaigns, often with substantial influence. 8,9 Choice architecture, another
approach to influencing decisions, involves the organization of decision contexts to influence
choices, typically in ways that do not change the actual options that are available. 10 Choice
architecture has been shown to influence decisions as consequential as environmental efficiency, 11
retirement savings, 12 and organ donation. 13
Although there are numerous instances where both persuasive messaging and choice architecture
effectively alter decisions, there also are numerous instances where each fails to do so. 14,15,16
Interventions that effectively encourage savings decisions among LMI consumers may be
particularly difficult to construct because LMI consumers have strong and pre-planned preferences
regarding refund allocation, leaving little opportunity to influence saving decisions. 17,18 In a previous
iteration of the R2S project, for example, it was found that varying a suggested impetus for saving
(general goals, retirement, or emergencies) had no influence on savings deposit behavior. 19
In this research, we develop an intervention relying on persuasive messaging and choice architecture
to increase savings as part of the Refund to Savings Initiative, a large and ongoing project aimed at
increasing savings allocations at tax refund time among low- and moderate-income (LMI) filers. We
report findings from three experiments. Experiment 1 (N = 646,116) tests the effect of a messaging
and choice architecture intervention on real savings accounts deposits at tax refund time.
Experiment 2 (N = 569), a follow-up online experiment, separates the messaging and choice
architecture interventions to gauge the unique influence of each. Finally, Experiment 3 (N = 554),
also conducted online, isolates individual components of the choice architecture manipulation to
determine which features are essential for increasing savings.
Experiment 1: Tax Refund Field Experiment
In experiment 1, we rely on a large-scale field experiment to test whether messaging and choice
architecture interventions increase the amount of refund money allocated to savings accounts by
LMI consumers at tax time. The experiment is part of the R2S initiative, an ongoing collaboration
between researchers at Washington University, Duke University, and Intuit, Inc. The experiment
was embedded inside the TurboTax Freedom Edition (TTFE) tax preparation software offered free
to qualified LMI tax filers as a part of the IRS Free File Program. 20 During the 2015 tax season, filers
qualified for the TTFE if they had an adjusted gross income (AGI) of under $31,000, if they
qualified for the Earned Income Tax Credit, or if a member of the household was on active military
duty and had an AGI of under $60,000. The experiment ran from January 16th through June 7th 2015.
Intuit shared anonymous, aggregated tax data with the researchers in accordance with 26 U.S. Code
§ 7216.
Participants
Participants (n = 646,116, MAge = 35) were individuals who used TTFE and received a federal tax
refund when filing in 2015. Mean gross income was just over $15,000 (see Table 1 for sample
characteristics).
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Table 1. Experiment 1 (Field Experiment) Sample Description (n = 646,116)
Group assignment
Precautionary saving (“Be Prepared”)
Interactive goal
Interactive retirement
Control
Demographics
Age1
Filing Status
Single
Head of Household
Married, filing jointly, widow(er)
Married, filing separately
Any dependents
Number of dependents (excluding none)
Gross annual income
Amount of federal tax refund

N
161,011
161,936
161,217
161,952
% or Mean (SD)
35.25 (15.47)
66.84%
22.85%
9.39%
0.92%
31.37%
1.71 (0.89)
15,055 (9,941)
2,030 (2,379)

Note: Means are weighted across groups.
Calculated based on the difference between the weighted means of birthdate at tax
filing and filing date.

1

Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to a control group or one of three intervention groups.
Random assignment occurred within the TTFE software after participants completed their federal
income tax returns and learned they would receive a federal tax refund. Participants randomly
assigned to the control group received the standard TTFE screen on which they were prompted to
indicate how they wished to receive their refund (see Appendix A for screenshots of all experimental
conditions). These control group participants were asked whether they wished to receive their
refund via direct deposit into a bank account, via paper check, or split into multiple accounts or a
US Series I Savings Bond. If participants chose to receive their refund via direct deposit, on a
subsequent screen they were prompted to enter a bank account routing number, which could be
either for a checking account or a savings account. The refund amount allocated to savings
accounts served as our primary outcome of interest.
Participants in all 3 intervention groups, by contrast, viewed a savings-emphasis “choice
architecture” screen in which the option to deposit their refund into a savings account was explicitly
included in the top two options, the third option included direct deposit of the entire refund into a
checking or other bank account, and a final option included receipt of a paper check (see Appendix
A for screenshots of all experimental conditions).
In addition, participants in the three intervention groups were randomly assigned to receive 1) a
message about emergency savings, 21,22,23,24 2) a message about saving for one’s future that included
an optional interactive component encouraging participants to select specific future financial goals,
or 3) a message about retirement savings that also included an optional interactive component
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encouraging participants to select specific retirement savings goals (see Appendix A for exact
messaging).
Results
We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all
measures in the study 25 (please also see supplemental materials).
Sample balance
Sample balance was assessed across the four experimental groups for the following participant
demographic characteristics: age, 2014 gross income, filing status, number of dependents, health
insurance status, military status, and refund amount. In addition, we assessed sample balance based
on several additional variables that served as proxies for the financial characteristics and
circumstances of participants. These included any income from the following sources: dividends or
distributions, bank account interest, certain government payments (e.g., unemployment benefits),
retirement plan distributions, and/or social security benefits. Additionally, sample balance was
assessed for child, student loan, and/or higher education expense-related (i.e., American
Opportunity and Lifetime Learning) tax credits, for mortgage interest, real estate tax, medical
expenses, self-employed health insurance, and moving expenses deductions, and for tax filing date.
All aggregate data bivariate tests for these covariates were statistically non-significant, indicating that
randomization was effective and that the four groups did not differ in any systematic way regarding
participant characteristics that might explain variation in savings outcomes.
Main results
The refund amount allocated to savings accounts served as our primary outcome of interest. Though
a savings bond purchase was an option in all conditions, we excluded this as a dependent variable on
a substantive basis. We are most interested in low- and moderate-income households having access
to liquid financial assets in savings accounts to meet household needs. Furthermore, the overall rate
of savings bond purchases was extremely low (< .1% in each condition); incorporating savings bond
uptake into the outcome measure does not meaningfully influence results.
Participants in each of the three intervention groups were significantly more likely to deposit to
savings accounts than were participants in the control group. For example, 13% of participants who
received the emergency savings intervention allocated all or a portion of their refunds to a savings
account compared to 8% of control group participants χ2(1, n = 358,097) = 1600, p < .001 (see
Table 2 for full results).
Table 2. Treatment Effects (n = 646,116).
Outcome
Percent who saved
Percent who saved entire refund
Mean amount saved (SD)

Control
8.44%
7.92%
$160.25
($856.15)

Emergency
Savings
13.34%***
12.54%***
$243.76***
($1032.69)

Interactive Goals
12.60%***
11.83%***
$229.52***
($1004.87)

Interactive Retirement
12.40%***
11.63%***
$228.26***
($1001.43)

Note: *** p < .001.
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In addition, within treatment groups, participants who received the emergency savings intervention
were significantly more likely to deposit to savings accounts than were participants who received the
future savings interactive message χ2(1, n = 364,815) = 30.14, p < .001 and retirement savings
interactive message, χ2(1, n = 363,689) = 48.56, p < .001. There was no statistically significant
difference in the rate of depositing to savings when comparing the interactive future goal and
interactive retirement goal messages χ2(1, n = 323,153) = 2.85, p = .09. In total, the treatment
conditions led to an additional 20,916 tax filers depositing into savings vehicles.
Examining average amount saved reveals similar patterns. Participants in each intervention group
deposited significantly more money to savings than did participants in the control group (see Table
2). For example, participants who received the interactive retirement intervention deposited an
average of $68 more to savings accounts than control group participants t(315,104) = 20.74, Cohen’s
d = 0.07, p < .001. In total, the net increase in the refund saved due to treatments was $35,625,127.
Some statistically significant differences in savings deposits were observed between intervention
groups as well. Participants who received the emergency savings intervention on average deposited
$14 and $16 more to savings respectively than participants who received the interactive future goal
t(322,593) = 3.97, Cohen’s d = 0.01, p < .001 and interactive retirement t(321,896) = 4.33, Cohen’s d
= 0.02, p < .001 interventions. There was no statistically significant difference in average savings
deposits when comparing the interactive future goal and interactive retirement goal messages
t(323,151) = 0.36, p = .72.
Sub-group outcomes
Treatment effects for both savings deposit rates and average amount deposited to savings were very
stable across differences in both filing status and age (see Table 3). For example, intervention group
participants who filed as Single deposited $43 more to savings than their control group counterparts (p <
.001), while intervention group participants who filed as Head of Household deposited $138 more to
savings than their control group counterparts (p < .001). The higher net difference observed among
Head of Household filers in the intervention group was due to a larger average refund (n = 110,559
MRefund = $4,796.15) compared to Single filers in the intervention group (n = 323,679 MRefund = $860.08).
Table 3. Treatment Effects by Subgroup
Savings Rate
Control
Intervention
%
%
Filing Status
Single (n = 431,879)
Head of Household (n = 147,646)
Age
15 to 24 (n = 211,605)
25 to 34 (n = 180,352)
35 to 44 (n = 90,747)
45 to 54 (n = 69,544)
55 to 64 (n = 57,833)
65+ (n = 36,035)

Amount Saved
Control
Intervention
Mean (SD)
Mean (SD)

8.26
7.47

12.93***
9.88***

65.61 (338.85)
390.84 (1448.35)

108.81 (448.65)***
529.08 (1670.77)***

10.37
6.52
6.90
6.99
6.79
6.77

15.24***
11.41***
9.67***
9.61***
9.83***
9.78***

81.19 (462.23)
179.79 (930.89)
286.36 (1259.17)
226.31 (1055.81)
153.80 (809.61)
89.99 (500.67)

119.13 (543.55)***
284.46 (1134.25)***
402.80 (1481.16)***
300.03 (1193.77)***
214.53 (931.48)***
132.99 (622.13)***

Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
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Discussion
Experiment 1 documents a significant and substantial effect of choice architecture and messaging on
LMI consumers’ real choices to allocate tax refund money to savings accounts. Although one
particular message (emergency savings) appears somewhat more successful than the other messages,
the most substantial effect was that all versions of the treatment (choice architecture + messaging)
considerably increased savings allocations compared to the control condition. In Experiment 2, we
attempt to isolate and compare the choice architecture and messaging components of the treatment
manipulation to determine the effectiveness of each intervention.
Experiment 2: Choice Architecture vs. Messaging
Experiment 2 tested the Choice Architecture and Messaging manipulations separately in an online
simulation, gauging the unique influence of each intervention.
Participants
Six-hundred participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and received $0.50 for
participating. For both Experiments 2 and 3, conducted online via Mechanical Turk, we analyzed
data only from those participants who passed an instructional manipulation check designed to
identify inattentive participants.21,26 Recruitment sample size and the exclusion criterion were set ex
ante. For Experiment 2, this procedure resulted in a total of 569 analyzed responses (MAge = 34, 55%
female, 45% male).
Procedure
All participants were asked to imagine they had just filed their federal income tax returns and
expected to receive a $1,000 refund. In a 2 (Control, Choice Architecture) x 2 (No Message,
Figure 1: Experiment 2 amount saved based on choice architecture and messaging interventions. Note: * p < .05;
*** p < .001.
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Table 4. Experiment 2 Savings Outcomes Based on Choice Architecture and Messaging Interventions

Control (choice options), No Message
Choice Architecture, No Message
Control (choice options), Emergency Savings Message
Choice Architecture, Emergency Savings Message

Amount Saved
(Mean)
$178.57
$369.39***
$280.64*
$456.07***

Percent
Who Saved
18%
41%***
30%*
56%***

Percent Who Saved
Entire Refund
18%
31%*
27%†
37%***

Note: †p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 compared to Control/No Message.

Emergency Savings Message) between subjects experimental design, participants were randomly
assigned either to view refund allocation options like those from the Control condition or from
the Choice Architecture conditions in the field experiment; participants also were randomly
assigned to view either no additional savings messaging, or to view the Emergency Savings
message from the field experiment (the emergency saving message was found to be the most
effective message in Experiment 1). After making initial allocation decisions on the experimental
screens (See Appendix B), subsequent screens guided participants through follow-up aspects of
their choice including, for example, exactly how much money they wished to allocate to savings
versus checking accounts.
Results
A 2 x 2 ANOVA predicting amount deposited to savings revealed a significant main effect of the
choice architecture manipulation (F(1, 565) = 24.72, p < .001), a significant main effect of
emergency savings messaging (F(1, 565) = 6.57, p = .011), and no interaction between the two
manipulations, p > 0.25. A binary logistic regression predicting whether or not participants directed
any refund to savings showed similar patterns: a significant main effect of the choice architecture
manipulation, (Exp(B) = 3.17, p < .001), a significant main effect of emergency savings messaging
(Exp(B) = 1.93, p = .022), and no interaction between the two manipulations, p > 0.25.
Discussion
Experiment 2 tested the messaging and choice architecture manipulations separately. Both
manipulations from the field experiment increased savings intentions when tested individually,
within a new context, and with a new sample.
Experiment 3: Effective Choice Architecture Components
The final experiment, Experiment 3, tests which elements of the Choice Architecture manipulation
are essential to increase savings.
Participants
Six-hundred participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and received $0.50 for
participation. Following procedures from Experiment 2, we analyzed data only from those
participants who passed an instructional manipulation check designed to identify inattentive
participants, resulting in a total of 554 analyzed responses (MAge = 35, 56% female, 44% male).
CENTER FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
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Figure 2: Experiment 3 amount saved based on Choice Architecture components. Note: *p < .05;
**p < .01; ***p < .001, compared to Control.

Procedure
Participants imagined that they had just filed their federal income tax returns and expected to receive
a $1,000 refund. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 5 experimental conditions that varied
choice option descriptions. The first two conditions (“Control” and “Choice Architecture”)
replicated the two conditions from Experiment 2 without messaging, simulating the choice
architecture intervention from Experiment 1.
The remaining three conditions separately tested the functional pieces of the choice architecture
intervention. The choice architecture intervention was functionally different from the control
condition in three main ways: 1) savings was explicitly emphasized within the choice options, tested
in a “Savings Emphasized” condition, 2) savings explicitly was mentioned twice among the choice
options, tested in a “Savings Emphasized Twice” condition, and 3) one option included a simple
one-click single-decision option that allowed participants to make one click to allocate their entire
refund into savings, tested in a “Savings--Single Click” condition. After making the initial allocation
decision on the experimental screens (See Appendix C), subsequent screens guided participants
through detailed aspects of their choice (e.g., exactly how much money they wished to allocate to
savings versus checking).
Results
Replicating the pattern observed in Experiments 1 and 2, planned contrasts revealed that
participants allocated significantly more money to savings accounts in the Choice Architecture
condition compared to the Control condition (MChoice Architecture = $340.68, MControl = $190.91 , t(549) =
2.63, Cohen’s d = .22, p = 0.009).
Participants did not, however, allocate more to savings in the Savings Emphasized condition
(MSavingEmphasized = $174.75 compared to the Control condition p > .25, suggesting that merely
emphasizing savings one time is not sufficient to influence refund allocations. Participants did
allocate more to savings in both the Savings Emphasized Twice condition M = $392.73 t(549) =
CENTER FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
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Table 5: Experiment 3 Savings Outcomes Based on Choice Architecture Components

Control
Choice Architecture
Savings Emphasized
Savings Emphasized Twice
Savings--Single Click

Amount Saved (Mean)
$190.91
$340.68**
$174.76
$392.73***
$431.86***

Percent Who Saved
19%
39%***
21%
44%***
54%***

Percent Who Saved
Entire Refund
19%
30%*
14%
35%**
34%**

Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001, compared to Control.

3.45, Cohen’s d = 0.29, p < 0.001; and Savings—Single Click condition M = $431.86, M = $392.73
t(549) = 4.26, Cohen’s d = 0.36, p < 0.001 compared to the Control condition, suggesting that the
heavy emphasis of savings and/or the increased ease of depositing to savings contribute to the
Choice Architecture finding (see Figure 2 and Table 4).
We also analyzed categorical income information from participants’ responses to final demographics
questions. We find that the savings allocation patterns held for both LMI consumers (defined as
having annual household incomes at or below $35,000) and non-LMI consumers. We conducted a
binary logistic regression predicting whether or not participants deposited to savings, including
categorical predictors for each experimental condition (except Control) and interaction terms
combining each experimental condition and LMI status. Results mirrored the findings in Table 2
and further showed no interaction with LMI status: the coefficients for Choice Architecture (p <
0.002), Savings Emphasized three times (p = 0.001) and Savings-One Click (p < 0.001) were each
statistically significant whereas Savings Emphasized was not (p > 0.25); none of the interaction
terms with LMI status was significant (p’s > 0.25).
Discussion
Experiment 3 tested individual components of the choice architecture manipulation, demonstrating
that although heavily emphasizing saving or making saving a simple one-click decision both
increased savings, simply making saving explicit among choice options via choice architecture was
not sufficient to increase savings deposits. The result that merely making saving explicit among
choice options does not increase savings (“Savings emphasized” condition), suggests that the
patterns from Experiment 1 and 2 are not simply due to reminding consumers that allocating to a
savings account is an option. In addition, there were no significant differences by income, suggesting
that the choice architecture intervention may be effective across income groups.
General Discussion
Although previous research has struggled to find interventions that effectively increase savings
among low-moderate income (LMI) consumers,17 the current research documents a robust choice
architecture and messaging intervention that results in substantially higher savings within this
financially vulnerable group. Further, this intervention represents a program that could be
implemented on a large scale because it is both low-touch and low-cost.
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Experiment 1, a large-scale field experiment (N = 646,116) and part of the R2S initiative, documents
a choice architecture and messaging intervention that increases real deposits to saving accounts
during tax refund time by LMI consumers by approximately 50%. Experiment 2, an online followup experiment, experimentally separated the choice architecture and messaging components, finding
that both appear to increase savings deposits. Experiment 3, a final follow-up experiment, tested
individual features of the choice architecture intervention, finding that heavy emphasis of savings
and making saving “frictionless” via choice architecture both increase allocations to savings
accounts, however, explicitly mentioning savings once within choice options does not.
Although the present research identifies an effective intervention to increase savings deposits at tax
refund time, some may question whether one-time savings deposits are a meaningful measure of
“saving” or whether saving is even the most beneficial use of tax refunds. Some recent research 27
finds that low-income tax filers often use refunds to reduce high-interest unsecured debt—an
important financial priority that we do not capture in the current investigation. Further, some
additional research finds that when consumers allocate money to savings, they may be unwilling to
subsequently use those funds to cover non-discretionary expenses, 28 potentially prompting the
future adoption of expensive debt to make ends meet. 29 Nevertheless, when consumers do not have
emergency savings, they may be more likely to use high-cost financial services such as payday loans
in the future. 30 Further, there is some evidence to suggest that saving at tax time has lasting effects:
in a previous iteration of R2S, households that chose to deposit into savings vehicles at tax time
were less likely to report material hardships six months after filing their taxes than were households
who did not deposit to savings at tax time (even after adjusting for observable differences between
groups).19 Future research exploring long-term financial and psychological health outcomes based on
these and related interventions would help to direct development of interventions that yield the
largest possible benefit to consumers’ financial well-being. In sum, this research documents a robust
choice architecture and messaging intervention that increases real savings accounts deposits among
financially vulnerable consumers at tax time.
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Appendix A Supplemental Figure A1. Materials *

Future Message + Interaction + Choice Architecture

Control

Emergency Savings Message + Choice Architecture
*

Retirement Message + Interaction + Choice Architecture

Used with permission from Intuit. All rights reserved.

CENTER FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS

14

Appendix B
Experiment 2: Experiment Materials and Conditions

Messaging Manipulation
NO MESSAGE
(NONE)
EMERGENCY SAVINGS MESSAGE
No one knows what life has in store. In fact, 2 out of 3 people will have an unexpected financial
emergency in 6 months or less. It pays to save!
BE PREPARED: Don't let life catch you by surprise. Save something today and have cash on hand
when it's needed down the road.
Choice Architecture Manipulation

CHOICE ARCHITECTURE

CONTROL
How would you like to get your
federal refund?

How would you like to get your
federal refund?

o Direct deposit to my bank
account

o Direct deposit my entire
refund into a savings
account

o Mail me a paper check
o Split into multiple
accounts

o Direct deposit some of my
refund into a savings
account, and put some into
another bank account
o Direct deposit my entire
refund into a checking
account
o Mail me a paper check
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Appendix C

Experiment 3: Experiment Materials and Conditions

CHOICE ARCHITECTURE

CONTROL

How would you like to get
your federal refund?

How would you like to get
your federal refund?

o Direct deposit to my bank
account
o Mail me a paper check
o Split into multiple
accounts

o Direct deposit my entire
refund into a savings
account
o Direct deposit some of my
refund into a savings
account, and put some into
another bank account
o Direct deposit my entire
refund into a checking
account
o Mail me a paper check

Savings Emphasized Once

Savings Emphasized Twice

Single-click Savings

How would you like to get
your federal refund?

How would you like to get
your federal refund?

How would you like to get
your federal refund?

o Direct deposit my entire
refund or some of my
refund into a savings
account
o Direct deposit my entire
refund into a checking
account
o Mail me a paper check

o Direct deposit my entire
refund into one or more
savings accounts
o Direct deposit some of my
refund into a savings
account, and put some
into another bank account
o Direct deposit my entire
refund into a checking
account
o Mail me a paper check

o Direct deposit my entire
refund into a savings
account
o Direct deposit my entire
refund or some of my
refund into a checking
account
o Mail me a paper check
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